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THE NLRB AND DETERMINATION OF
THE APPROPRIATE UNIT: NEED
FOR A WORKABLE STANDARD
T. L. GRooMs*
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended,' Section 9 (c),2
provides for the filing of a petition when a substantial number of the
employees wish to be represented for collective bargaining and the
employer refuses to recognize them. The Board then investigates to
see if there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a question of
representation exists, and if so it orders an election by secret ballot.
Thereupon the representative designated or selected by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes becomes the
exclusive representative for collective bargaining.3
It can be said then, that Section 9 (c) recognizes and provides a
solution for disputes over questions of representation. Section 9 (a),4
states the representative must be chosen by a majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, and herein lies the basis
for dispute. To the extent that management can show that the union's
claim of a majority includes men with job classifications not appropri-
ately within that union, it may destroy the union's claim to represen-
tation. If the union can show the converse, i.e., that their claim of a
majority includes only those men of job classifications appropriately
* Industrial Relations Department, Deere and Company, Moline, Illinois. A.B., 1960,
Parsons College; B.C.L., 1963, College of William and Mary.
1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq.
2. Id. § 159(c): Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-(A) by an employee or group of
employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that
a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining
and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative
defined in section 9(a) . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reason-
able cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall
provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice... If such a question of representa-
tion exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
3. Id. § 159(a): Representative designated or selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining . . . [italics added].
4. Id.
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included, they are entitled to representation, and it would be an unfair
labor practice for management to refuse to bargain with it.5 It is for
this reason that the question of what is an appropriate unit is of im-
portance and concern to labor and management.
With this realization, certain questions present themselves. What is
an appropriate unit? Who determines what is an appropriate unity
And, by what test is it determined?
As to the first two questions raised, the Act is explicit in stating the
Board shall decide the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining, and that it shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof.6 By what tests the Board determines the ap-
propriate unit is the subject of this article. Since the employer must
bargain with a union representing a majority of employees of job
classifications appropriately within that union, he must first decide
whether the alleged "majority" includes employees of job classifications
not appropriately included, before determining whether he must, in
fact, bargain. To do so intelligently the employer must be aware of
the factors the Board uses to make a correct determination. The first
proviso of Section 9 (b)7 states what the Board may not do, when de-
termining the question, but offers nothing of the positive factors in-
volved.
Before proceeding farther, three areas must be stated to place the
inquiry of this paper in its proper perspective. First, is the extent of
the Board's determination. The Board's determination of what con-
stitutes an appropriate unit is binding, unless it is arbitrary or capricious
5. Id. S 158(a) (5).
6. Id. S 159(b): The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof...
7. Id.... Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate
for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who
are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote
for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decided that any craft unit is inappropriate for such
purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board de-
termination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed unit vote against separate
representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes,
together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against
employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect
the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be cer-
tified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organiza-
tion admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization
which admits to membership, employees others than guards.
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or "lacking in a rational basis".s -Vith such force behind the Board's
decision, it is necessary to reveal the factors it employs in arriving at
its decision. Second, is the nature of the different types of units the
Board may decide appropriate. "Unit" is generally used to describe
the area of job classification from which employees are grouped for
purposes of bargaining with management. Examples of these "units"
range in size from the Multi-Employer, where all of the employees of
an industry bargain collectively with the various employers, through
the Single-Employer Unit, the Multi-Plant Unit, Single-Plant Unit,
Plant-Wide Unit, Departmental-Unit, Craft-Unit, and Special em-
ployees. The latter groups, it may be noted, may be composed of only
three men. In each of the above units, the three factors will be con-
sidered by the Board. However, it is apparent that some of the units
mentioned will necessitate the consideration of new factors in de-
termining the appropriate unit, because of their unique characteristics.
Finally, how does the Board interpret the word "appropriate"?
There is nothing, in the statute which requires that the unit for bar-
gaining be the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most
appropriate unit; the Act requires only that the unit be 'appropriate'.
It must be appropriate to ensure the employees in each case 'the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act'.9
SIMILARITY OF SKILLS, WAGES, HOURS, AND OTHER WORKING
CONDITIONS AMONG THE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED.
This factor used by the Board is the most important factor. It is the
Board's responsibility to determine the unit which will best act to
represent the employees involved for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. The factor-Skills, Wages, Hours, etc.,-is important only
when there exists a similarity among the employees involved. They are
important because they indicate a common interest, and thus a responsi-
bility common to all members, is imposed upon the representative.
In the Breman Steel Company case the Board stated the criterion of
the similarity factor:
For a group of employees to constitute an appropriate bargaining
unit, such group must be at least a readily identifiable and homogeneous
group apart from other employees.10
8. N..RJ. v. Hearst Publications, Inc, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
9. Morand Bros. Beverage Co, 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 412 (1950).
10. 93 N.L.R.B. 720, 725 (1951).
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When this factor is used it merely determines what is appropriately in-
cluded, as well as excluded. In the Brown Cigar Company case" the
employer was a wholesaler who received, sold, and distributed cigars,
drugs, and beach sundries. Its operation consisted of receiving merchan-
dise at its warehouse, assembling orders, loading its trucks, and de-
livering its products to retail distributors. The employer had three cigar
driver-salesmen, and one cigar and drug driver-salesman. Each of them
loaded his own truck and traveled assigned routes, delivering merchan-
dise and soliciting new business. The only difference between the two
was that the cigar and drug driver-salesman did not receive a com-
mission. There was also a full-time man who performed duties in the
warehouse, and delivered cigars. He spent about 50% of his time de-
livering as opposed to the other driver-salesmen who spent 75% of their
time selling. The Board stated:
Although the driver-salesmen, including the drug salesman work on a
salary basis, while the other employees are hourly paid, all employees
of the Employer enjoy a community of interests . . . [and] the overall
unit requested by Employer is appropriate.12
If it could be said that an employee who works at one job 50% of his
time acquires the characteristics of that job, could the employee who
works two different job classifications under the same employer (equal
time at each) have characteristics of both jobs for purposes of classi-
fication? The Board has never decided the problem.
In John R. Figg, Incorporated," a union sought to include truck-
drivers, warehousemen, excluding all office employees, professional em-
ployees, guards, supervisors, as defined in the Act and "all other em-
ployees". The employer, who was engaged in the wholesale grocery
business, was in general agreement with the proposed unit, but objected
to the exclusion of "all other employees", on the grounds that it would
exclude a fruit market loader (in another town), a regular summer
employee, and a janitor who sometimes aided in loading. The Board
found that the janitor and fruit market loader should be included because
their employment interests were substantially the same as those of the
other employees. It stated that there was not a sufficient community of
11. 124 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1959).
12. Id. at 1158.
13. 124 N.L.R.B. 913 (1959).
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interests between the college student who worked as a regular summer
employee, and the other employees.
The foregoing cases illustrate that all too often the Board does not
clearly show the similarity of wages, hours, etc., but rather finds that
they did or did not exist. In this respect, the cases are of little aid in
indicating what will be considered similar, for guiding the union or
employer in determining this question.
While the Board considers the similarities of interests factor important,
it recognizes its limitation. In the Smythe case, the court affirmed the
Board's decision, stating:
It is true that similarities of duties and working conditions are factors
which are proper for consideration ... however, mutuality of interests
is by no means the 'primary and controlling' test to be applied. Where,
as here, the employees engaged in similar pursuits widely separated
from each other geographically, and are under local supervision, a de-
termination of the Board of a unit comprised of only those employees
who work within a comparatively small area neither excludes the re-
maining employees from the benefits of the Act nor offends the statute
which authorizes the Board to establish an appropriate unit...14
The Board has stated that the fact that certain employees have been ex-
cluded from one unit because of lack of similarities does not indicate
that they constitute a separate unit.5 On the other hand, the fact that
certain employees are excluded from one unit because of a lack in similar-
ity does not prevent their inclusion in another appropriate unit. 6 What
the Board determines when using the "similarity of interests" factor is
that certain employees from certain job classifications either are or
are not appropriately included within a unit-no more, no less.
The similarity of interests factor is employed in cases involving
special classifications and circumstances. For example homeworkers
were excluded from a production unit since they had none of the
interests or working conditions of regular employees. However, when
the determination involves special classifications or circumstances, such
as temporary, part-time, or seasonal employees, the Board inquires into
the regularity of employment; the difference in pay; possibility of
14. N.L.R.B. v. Smythe, 212 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1954).
15. Paramount Shoe Alfg. Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 866 (1947).
16. Continental Steel Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 97 (1945).
17. Howell Electric Motors, 59 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1944), R. L. Polk & Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
443 (1950). But cf., J. R. Osherenko, 73 N.L.R.B. 670 (1947).
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permanent employment; and rate of turnover.'8 At least to the extent
that other fqctors are involved here, the similarity of interest factor is
more forceful in that the analysis is deeper. When the decision is
based upon deeper analysis, more facts are recited as relevant, and the
Board states the facts which give rise to its conclusion. Such a decision
provides a basis for an employer's future use. He may research the
question and come up with what are considered pertinent facts, and
what facts were determinative of the question. It is to this extent that
special classification cases provide a better aid to an employer for his
future use.
HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
This factor is based upon the presumption that what the parties have
done in the past in respect to collective bargaining, is evidence of what
should be done in the future. If a particular union has successfully
represented a certain group of employees in the past, it will be presumed
that they can continue to do so in the future. This presumption is
overcome when there exists strong reasons for doing so. While the
"history of collective bargaining" usually concerns bargaining between
the parties, the history of similar groups in similar industries and locali-
ties is sometimes used.19 The history used need not be that immediately
preceding the dispute .0 if there is some reason for doing so.
The Board's discretionary power in applying the "history of collective
bargaining" factor has varied over the years. As early as 1945, a
Federal Court 2' held that a determination by the Board that a particular
unit was appropriate for collective bargaining will not be overturned
by the courts unless the determination appears arbitrary or capricious.
The Court concluded that a determination made solely on the basis of
collective bargaining history was not arbitrary, where prior contracts
indicated an established pattern of collective bargaining, and where no
special circumstances existed. When the "history of collective bargain-
18. Marvel Roofing Products, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 292 (1954); Callaghan-Cleveland, Inc.,
120 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1958); Economy Food Center, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 901 (1963); Dov-
Jones & Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 421 (1963); L. Weimann Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1953);
Mission Pack Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1960); Tol-Pac, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1960).
19. Toffenetti Restaurant Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 640 (1956).
20. National Carbon Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1954). Though there was an absence
of bargaining history for the preceding five years, the Board looked to the earlier
nine years, and stated such would not preclude a change. See also, Safeway Stores, 129
N.L.R.B. 1000 (1960).
21. N.L.R.B. v. National Broadcasting Co., 150 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
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ing" factor is stated as a "presumption", it does not shock the senses
that past human action is being considered as relevant evidence from
which future conduct is to be predicted. Is not the true inquiry whether
or not certain job classifications are appropriately within a unit? What
possible relevancy exists between successful representation and whether
or not a certain job classification is within an appropriate unit? It seems
conspicuous that the Board has never concerned itself with the issue of
relevance.
A case of great influence upon the Board's discretion in applying the
"history of collective bargaining" factor was set forth in the Matter of
the American Can Company,22 which was later to be referred to as the
American Can Doctrine. The essence of this doctrine was that the
bargaining history of an employer, for a long period of time, might
provide a sufficient reason for denying a later request for separation for
craft representation, since it has been thoroughly assimilated with the
industrial unit. It was later held that if the craft group has successfully
preserved its identity as such throughout the period of its inclusion in
the production and maintenance unit, a craft unit could be carved out
of the larger industrial unit.23
Subsequently, Section 9 (b) (2)24 of the N.L.R.A. was passed, pro-
viding that the Board may not decide that any craft unit is in-
appropriate for purposes of insuring the employee rights guaranteed by
Section 725 of the Act on the ground that "a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the
employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representa-
tion." Interpreting this statutory change, the Board stated that the
American Can Doctrine made no distinction as to whether the bargain-
ing history was predicated upon voluntary recognition by the employer
or from the Board's determination. 26 The Board, being aware that the
legislative history preceding the enactment of Section 9 (b) (2)27
indicated a Congressional intent to overrule the American Can Doctrine,
stated that the American Can case was not synonymous with the phrase
"prior Board determination", because the history could be predicated
upon agreement. Consequently the Board stated:
22. 13 N.L.R3. 1252 (1939).
23. General Electric Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 57 (1944).
24. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(b) (2), effective 1947.
25. Id. § 157.
26. National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
27. Supra, note 24.
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We believe that the legislative history preceding the enactment of
9 (b)(2) does not adequately establish a certain Congressional intent
to eliminate the use of bargaining history by a particular employer
as a controlling factor in determining the issue of separate craft repre-
sentation.28
In essence the Board held that although craft units may not be found
inappropriate because of a "prior Board determination" establishing a
different unit, they may still consider the history of collective bargaining
in determining the appropriateness of a proposed craft unit. To say it
differently, the amendment was held not to impose a mandatory duty
on the Board to carve craft units out of pre-existing industrial unions.
DESIRE OF THE EMPLOYEES
The wishes of the employees, the third factor, becomes important
when either of two or more units is otherwise appropriate. In such a
situation the Board usually withholds determination until an election
among the employees involved is held and some expression of their de-
sires is available. This is the Globe Doctrine.2 9 In Globe, three separate
craft unions sought recognition, as did an industrial union, for the same
employees. The Board stated:
In view of the facts described . . . it appears that the company's pro-
28. National Tube Co., supra, note 26 at 1205. Seven years later the Board, in con-
sidering the appropriateness of a craft union, emphasized that a craft shall not be
considered inappropriate on the ground that a different unit had been established by
prior certification, and that craft unions would be deemed appropriate where a true
craft is sought and where the union concerned had traditionally represented crafts.
American Potash & Chemical Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). Notwithstanding, a
Board order finding a unit of electricians appropriate was refused enforcement on a
failure to bargain charge because in National Tube the Board had excluded steel,
lumber, aluminum and wet milling industries from the craft union rule, such industries
being highly integrated and having long histories of plant-wide bargaining and because
the industry in question (plate glass) involved the same conditions. N.L.R.B. v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959).
Where the question of appropriateness has become important in actions seeking
severance which involve not crafts, but units claiming to be functionally distinct, the
Board has rejected the concept that traditional job classifications are controlling. In-
stead, predominate community of interest is the criterion. In making this determination,
the test is: is the unit seeking severance a functionally distinct group? Does this group
have overriding special interests? Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962).
For a discussion of the concept of appropriateness relative to geographic spread of the
unit in the retail stores industry, see Sav-on Drugs, 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
29. Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
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duction workers can be considered either as a single unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining... or as three such units as
claimed by the petitioning unions. The history of successful separate
negotiations at the company's plant, and also the essential separateness
of polishing and punch press work at that plant, and the existence of
a requirement of a certain amount of skill . . . are proof of the
feasibility of the latter approach . . . In such a case where the con-
siderations are so evenly balanced, the determining factor is the
desire of the men themselves . . . We will therefore order elections
to be held ... 30
In W. C. Hamilton and Sons,31 the Board ordered a severance of
various craft units from the production and maintenance unit, despite
a sixteen year history of bargaining on a broader basis, illustrating the
interrelation of the "history of collective bargaining" factor with the
"desires of the employees" factor. Hamilton also illustrates how much
weight an employer should give to the "history of collective bargaining"
factor. Sixteen years of bargaining on a broader basis was cast aside
without any reference to what "strong reasons" impelled the Board to
so rule. The Globe Doctrine is a permissive doctrine. It permits a
self-determination election, but the Board has held an election unneces-
sary where the desires of the employees are clearly demonstrated from
the evidence.3 2
The factor of "the desires of the employees", though it is determina-
tive of the issue of appropriateness of the unit, is limited in use because
it is employed only where two or more units otherwise appropriate
seek recognition. Collective bargaining is, by its name, a group -action,
and whether it functions effectively might well depend upon whether
the employees desire to be in that unit. Yet the Globe Doctrine has not
escaped criticism. Edwin S. Smith, dissenting in Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Company case stated:
The decision vests in the hands of a small group of employees the
choice of determining whether in this mass-production plant, em-
ploying nearly 10,000 workers, a complete industrial unit, or one
from which one or more crafts have been severed, is most appropriate
to promote collective bargaining... The wishes of the great majority
are ignored. The devicz of holding such an election to resolve the
30. id. at 303.
31. 104 N.L.R.B. 627 (1958).
32. Worthington Pump and Machine Corp., 4 NL.R.B. 448 (1937).
1965]
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conflict between industrial union adherents and craft conscious groups.
as here represented... is obviously inadequate to throw any light on
the problem of what is the most appropriate bargaining unit...
Mr. Smith believed that self-determination elections would not effec-
tuate the policy of the Act (to foster and obtain industrial peace) be-
cause of strikes by strong craft unions bringing the entire factory to a
standstill.
The Act states that the "Board shall determine in each case" 34 what
the "appropriate unit" is. It seems inescapable that the Globe Doctrine
delegates from the Board to the employees the power to determine the
appropriate unit. Granted, the Board finds two or more unions ap-
propriate, and the employees choose which they prefer. Can it be that
one job classification can be considered to be appropriately in either of
two units, and yet assure to the employees involved fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act? Did not Congress expect
the Board to determine the appropriate unit most likely to ensure the
employees their freedom in exercising their rights? The Act says "the
fullest freedom." 35 Congress has not often exhibited an intent to be
satisfied with second best, and there is nothing in the Act to evince
such .an intent.
EVALUATION
The employer may find himself in a dilemma on questions of repre-
sentation by virtue of two provisions of the N.L.R.A. On the one hand
the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain with a representative of a majority of the employees of an
appropriate unit.36 On the other hand, if there is a real question as to
whether the union represents a majority, the Act makes it an unfair
labor practice to recognize such a representative."
The Board has held that a neutral employer on being confronted
with conflicting representation claims by two rival unions, cannot recog-
nize one of them until its rights to be recognized have been finally de-
33. 4N.L.R.B. 159, 176-177 (1937).
34. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(b).
35. Id.
36. id. § 158(a) (5).
37. Id. §5 158 (a)(1), (2); N.L.R.B. v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th
Cir. 1950). Since the employer recognized the union with the majority, it was held no
violation as there was no real dispute.
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termined by the Board.3" In Midwest Piping and Supply Company,
Inc.,3 9 the employer violated Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (2)4° by
executing a "union shop" contract with one union when representation
proceedings were pending before the Board. The Board stated the
Employer's conduct accorded unwarranted prestige to the union, and
encouraged membership in one union while discouraging it in another,
and otherwise restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 741 of the Act.
Nevertheless the Board recognized an exception to the Midwest Pipe
Doctrine in the William D. Gibson case.42 It was here held that an
employer could lawfully execute a new collective bargaining contract
with an incumbent labor organization even though a rival union had
filed a representation petition with the Board. The Gibson case cannot
be read to license the employer to bargain with the incumbent union
on any matter.
Further, St. Louis Independent Packing Company,43 imposed a limita-
tion on the Gibson exception, though it did not refer to the case. The
Board here held that the employer violated Section 8 (a) (1) and
8 (a) (2) 44 of the Act when it entered into a temporary wage increase
with the incumbent union five days before a self-determination election,
stating:
The Act forbids interference by an employer with the rights of his
employees to bargain collectively, and, for that purpose, to select
their own bargaining representative. When two unions are vieing
[sic] for majority support of his employees, an employer must, of
course, maintain a position of strict neutrality. He must refrain from
any action which tends to give either an advantage over its rival; he
may do nothing which tends to coerce his employees to join or refrain
from joining a particular unipn. Recognition of one competitor as
bargaining agent during this contest period, absent proof of majority
support, is a proscribed act.4 5
38. Matter of Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943); Matter of Keystone
Steel and Wire Co., 62 NJ.R.B. 683 (1945).
39. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
40. Supra, note 37.
41. Supra, note 25.
42. 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954).
43. 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961).
44. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a) (1), (2).
45. Supra, note 43 at 704, citing N.L.R.B. v. Indianapolis Newspaper, Inc., 210 F.2d
501, 503 (7th Cir. 1956).
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The limitation on the application of the Gibson exception is that the
employer can negotiate with the incumbent if he does not otherwise
violate the Act with respect to Section 8(a) 46 of the Act.
When this dilemma presents itself to the employer he must resort to
the factors the Board uses in determining the representation question
and he must look at the Act for the extent he is permitted to bargain
with the incumbent union. The factors have been set forth and dis-
cussed. They must now be analyzed in the light of whether they are
an adequate means in aiding the employer in determining whom he
must recognize, and what course of action he may take.
The three factors may be discussed and analyzed separately, but due
to their interrelation, the question of whether or not sufficiently defini-
tive criteria is available for an employer to determine the question of
recognition, must be answered by looking to all three of the factors.
The "similarity of interests" factor is recognized as the most important
factor. While the factor, as stated, is easily understood, it is difficult of
application. The Board's diverse results from its application remove
what certainty might otherwise exist. Since the employer finds himself
in a position of having to determine what the Board will decide when
faced with the same question . . . the problem is apparent. The factor
of "similarity of interests" is as difficult of application as the juristic
phrases of "reasonableness", "prudent man", "reasonable rate", etc. The
courts have, in recognition of this difficulty, stated that what is reason-
able under one set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another.
What is reasonable to one man is unreasonable to another. From view-
ing the cases involving the "similarity of interests" factor it is apparent
that there is no definitive criterion (outside the factor) available to the
employer. The only aid to the employer is that the Board will, in at-
tempting to effectuate the fullest freedom in the exercise of employee
rights, construe the factor broadly. Little help this is when it is re-
membered that the union does not bring affidavits claiming majority
representation. Mere allegations are brought, with evidence that would
be thrown out of any court for lack of authentication. The Act does
not require a union to prove its claim.
It is of no aid to the employer or union that the Board concludes
that a unit is or is not appropriate upon the application of the "similarity
of interests" factor. When the Board makes its decision in such a man-
ner it fails to answer two important questions:
46. Supra, note 44.
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1. Upon what particular facts did the Board make its decision?
2. What is the status of the employer to the group of employees ex-
cluded from the unit, when they are not otherwise a member of
a union?
The first question bears directly upon the employer's ability to be
able to make intelligent future determinations. To the extent that the
Board fails to set forth the reasons for finding or not finding similarities
of interests, it fails to adequately equip both the employer and the
union to decide this question. Though the Board is not under the
Administrative Procedure Act it would be well if the Board were re-
quired to make findings of fact with some degree of particularity. It
would aid the employer and the union. It would aid the Board in that
it would force the Board to state and consider the case at greater length.
It would help a reviewing court in making apparent from the record
what the skeleton of the Board's reasoning was.
As to the second question, the Board's failure to define the relation-
ship between the employer and the group excluded from the unit-is
analogous to a court's failure to provide complete relief. If the group,
previously excluded from the unit, asserts a majority representation, the
employer is faced with making the same type of decision, just made,
and without any aid from the Board. The Board has stated that the fact
certain employees have been excluded from one unit because of lack
of similarity of interests does not:
1. indicate that they constitute a separate unit, nor47
2. prevent their inclusion in another appropriate unit.48
The reasons the Board refuses to make a more definitive statement con-
cerning the status of the excluded employees may well be its refusal to
.organize labor, as that question is not honestly before it. However sound
the reasons, the effect of the Board's refusal to define the relationship
between the employer and the group excluded from the unit, is still the
same, as it effects the employer. He is unarmed!
The "history of collective bargaining" is premised upon the pre-
sumption that the manner in which the parties bargained in the past is
evidence of how they should bargain in the future, where the bargain-
ing has been successfully carried out. The history relied upon by the
Board may be that between the parties, or that of a similar group in
47. Supra, note 15.
48. Supra, note 16.
1965]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
similar industries in similar localities. When the history used is that
between the parties, it need not be the history immediately preceding
the dispute. Apparently the Board believes that since the history of
collective bargaining is irrelevant to the question of what is the ap-
propriate unit, it is irrelevant where the history originates.
The employer, when faced with deciding whether to recognize a unit
alleging a majority, finds little if any aid from the "history of collective
bargaining" factor. What history will the Board use? Will it use a
history from some similar industry in some similar locality? Will it use
the history between the parties? If it uses the history between the
parties, what period of history will be used-the immediate preceding
five years, ten years or what? A test such as this is no test at all, but a
means by which the Board can attempt to justify its action or inaction.
The history of collective bargaining is as irrelevant to the issue of ap-
propriateness of a job classification within a unit, as an employer's claim
that other employers are guilty of the same conduct of which he has
been charged as being an unfair labor practice.
This factor is even more nebulous than stated, as the Board can
disregard whatever history of collective bargaining existed for "strong
reasons" which compel an overcoming of that history. What little re-
semblance to stare decise the American Can Doctrine might have borne,
Congress, in passing Section 9 (b) (2) ;49 coupled with the National
Tube" case, completely irradicated it.
In spite of sixteen years of collective bargaining history, the Board
has ordered severance (if the majority so desired).51 In this case, as in
the majority of cases52 where severance is permitted in the face of a
history of collective bargaining on a broader basis, no "strong reason" is
stated or referred to by the Boaid which induced it to overcome the
history. This factor is so broad and nebulous that it is of no aid to an
employer faced with the problem of recognition. Obviously there are
sound reasons why the Board does not define more narrowly this factor,
as there are good reasons for not stating the "strong reasons" for over-
coming the history. Regardless of the merits of the reasons, this factor
remains of little aid to an employer as a means of deciding the question
of recognition.
49. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(b) (2).
50. Supra, note 26.
51. W. C. Hamilton & Sons, 104 N.L.R.B. 627 (1958).
52. Kroger Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 218 (1958); Hudson Pulp and Paper Corp., 94 N.L..R.B.
1018 (1951); Eagle Pencil Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 263 (1949).
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When, by application of all the factors, the Board concludes that
either of two or more units is otherwise appropriate, it orders a self-
determination election to acquire the employes' desires. This is the
third factor. Very little can be said about this factor as it relates to the
employer's use, because when it is applied the Board has already decided
the appropriateness of the unit, and the employer must recognize it.
An employer, for being placed in a "Damned-if-you-do, damned-
if-you-don't" position by Congress, is provided with extremely insuf-
ficient and vague standards in resolving whether he must, or is forbid-
den to, recognize a union. The Board has stated:
There is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for bargain-
ing be the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most ap-
propriate unit; the Act requires only that the unit be appropriate.r3
The employer must decide what the Board will decide. In other words,
if the employer is wise enough to decide the ultiniate, or most appropriate
unit (and what else should he strive for) he nay yet be wrong, and
guilty of an unfair labor practice, for the Board must only decide what
unit is "appropriate." If a reviewing court had stated that Congress
only imposed the burden on the Board of deciding the "appropriate
unit", and not the most appropriate unit, this language would be under-
standable. When the Board makes such a statement it amounts to an
admission that Congress recognized that the problem of deciding the
appropriate unit was onerous enough. Such an admission may well be
true, but what in the Act, or common sense, indicates that an employer,
who is not expert on labor problems, as is the Board, is any better
equipped to decide this onerous question.
In essence, an employer is required, under penalty of an unfair labor
practice, to read the Board's mind. And, if this were not impossible
enough, he must do so without any definitive aid as to how the Board's
mind functions. For the employer it is a lottery and the stakes are
high. The two obvious dangers Congress was, attempting to remedy,
which results in the employer's dilemma, were:
1. refusal to bargain with the employee's representative, and
2. any interference by the employer with the employee's rights as
set forth in the Act.
It is not the intent of this article to state that these objectives are not
53. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950).
28 WILLIAM AND MARY LAX REVIEW [Vol. 6:13
meritorious. But it is intended to state in the alternative that it is an
onerous burden placed on the employer without sound reason, or, that
if properly placed, that the employer is improperly equipped by
Congress and the Board to make a correct determination.
A provision setting forth power in the Board to provide a determina-
tion of the question before the parties act, as a declaratory judgment
does, would greatly aid the parties. When a real question arises it can
then be submitted and a decision rendered. The parties would be relieved
of having to act at their peril. This would encourage the peaceful solu-
tion of labor problems and remove the long-remaining effects of an
unfair labor practice charge. At present the employer is a "blind man
in a dark room, searching for a black cat that . . ." is there-and it is
not a domestic cat!
